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PUbLIC FINANCE IN POST-CONFLICT 
ENVIRONMENTS: A POLICy PAPER SERIES
In the wake of violent conflict, a key element of building a 
durable peace is building a state with the ability to collect 
and  manage  public  resources.  To  implement  peace 
accords and to provide public services, the government 
must be able to collect revenue, allocate resources, and 
manage expenditure in a manner that is regarded by its 
citizens as effective and equitable. 
The  tasks  of  revenue  mobilization,  budget  allocation, 
and  expenditure  management  are  bound  together  by 
political imperatives as well as economic logic. To collect 
revenues, the state must be seen as legitimate in the eyes 
of its citizens. and to secure legitimacy, the state must 
allocate  resources  and  manage  expenditure  effectively 
and equitably. 
The need to build legitimate and capable states in war-
torn societies is now widely recognized. The Principles 
for  Good  International  Engagement  in  Fragile  States, 
adopted by the development ministers of major donor 
countries  in  march  2005,  declares  that  statebuilding  is 
‘the  central  objective.’ This  represents  a  striking  break 
from  the  prevailing  wisdom  in  the  closing  decades  of 
the 20th century, when the state was widely regarded as 
the problem. The state has been rediscovered: it is now 
invoked as the solution. The policy rhetoric has changed 
from downsizing states to building state capacity. 
Yet little systematic work has been done on what the 
international community can and should do to strengthen 
the capacities of post-war states to mobilize, allocate, and 
spend public resources.  
This policy paper series, jointly published by the Center on 
International Cooperation (CIC) at new York University 
and the political economy research Institute (perI) at the 
University of massachusetts,  amherst, seeks to redress this 
gap by presenting innovative policy proposals targeting 
critical issues in postwar public finance. 
Building state capacities in public finance is crucial to the 
success of peacebuilding efforts for three reasons: 
First, governments must be able to ensure sustainable 
funding  for  new  democratic  institutions,  for  social 
programs that ease tensions and redress grievances, 
and  for  public  investments  to  promote  economic 
growth and development. In the early post-war years, 
•
countries  often  receive  a  large  influx  of  external 
assistance that temporarily can meet some of these 
needs.  But  aid  typically  diminishes  over  time,  so 
domestic  resources  are  necessary  to  sustain  these 
institutions and programs. a key challenge is to ensure 
that aid does not ‘crowd out’ domestic fiscal capacities, 
but instead stimulates their growth.
second,  fiscal  capacities  are  needed  to  build  a 
legitimate state. Democratic elections do not, in and 
of  themselves,  ensure  state  legitimacy.  neither  do 
‘quick  impact  projects’  in  which  international  aid 
agencies seek to fill urgent needs. legitimacy comes 
in large part from government delivery of services that 
people need and want. elections provide an avenue for 
the citizenry to voice demands; responding to those 
demands requires the capacity to mobilize, allocate, 
and spend public resources effectively.
Third, in some cases there is a need to curtail extra-
legal taxation by ‘warlords’ and armed groups so as 
to  enhance  security.  In  afghanistan,  for  example, 
control of border customs outposts is not only a fiscal 
issue but also a security issue. similarly, control over 
revenues  from  natural-resource  extraction,  such  as 
logging in Cambodia or diamonds in West africa, is 
often crucial for establishing the state’s monopoly not 
only in legitimate taxation but also in legitimate force. 
at the same time, domestic fiscal capacity is the only 
sustainable source of financing for public security after 
external peacekeepers have withdrawn.
The papers in this series offer policy proposals designed 
to strengthen the fiscal dimension of statebuilding. The 
authors draw on extensive personal experience in public 
finance  matters  in  war-torn  societies,  and  on  lessons 
from  comparative  studies,  including  Peace  and  the 
Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar Statebuilding 
(Boulder: lynne rienner, 2007), the outcome of the first 
stage of the CIC’s statebuilding project.  after a concise 
recapitulation  of  the  problems  to  be  addressed,  the 
authors concentrate on proposing solutions that can be 
practically implemented. 
We hope these policy papers will find a wide audience 
amongst  those  who  are  grappling  with  the  difficult 
challenges  of  post-war  reconstruction,  and  that  the 
proposals they put forward will assist in the twin tasks 
of building legitimate and effective states and building a 
durable peace. 
James K. BoYCe 
Lead economist, Peacebuilding as Statebuilding Program
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This  paper  advances  five  proposals  for  policies 
to  improve  revenue  generation  in  post-conflict 
environments. In the aftermath of violent conflict 
there  often  is  a  gap  between  demands  for  the 
restoration  of  basic  public  goods  and  services, 
including  jobs  and  security,  and  governmental 
capacity to generate revenue to meet these pressing 
needs. Improved revenue generation is a key task 
for building both a sustainable state and a durable 
peace.
CURRENT REVENUE-GENERATION POLICIES
revenue  generation  depends  primarily  on  three 
elements:  tax  policy,  the  revenue  administration 
system and overall economic activity. each of these 
elements  is  adversely  affected  by  conflict.  The 
challenge is exacerbated by weak state capacities for 
reform pressures from the international community 
to increase revenue so as to reduce dependence on 
external  assistance  and  international  policies  that 
actually undermine revenue collection. 
revenue  systems  in  low-income  countries  are 
more dependent on indirect taxation than those in 
industrialized countries. policies to increase revenue 
therefore  have  focused  on  improving  collections 
from indirect taxes, notably trade taxes. efforts have 
also been made to introduce direct taxes on wages 
and  business  income  to  lay  the  foundation  for  a 
transition to greater reliance on these in later years. 
measures  to  improve  revenue  administration 
have  focused  on  establishing  basic  infrastructure, 
developing  information-management  systems, 
strengthening customs administration, and creating 
large-taxpayer units that concentrate on the relatively 
small number of taxpayers likely to have the largest 
tax bills.
FIVE PROPOSALS TO ENHANCE REVENUE 
GENERATION
1. DONORS SHOULD ENTER INTO A MULTI-yEAR 
COMPACT TO PROVIDE MATCHING FUNDS FOR 
DIRECT bUDGET SUPPORT.
linking  budget-support  aid  to  the  amount  of 
revenue collected will strengthen the incentive for 
the  government  to  collect  revenue,  provide  more 
predictable  financing,  free  domestic  leadership  to 
focus on administrative reforms, and facilitate more 
effective cash management. a matching trust fund 
for this purpose can be part of a broader compact 
between  the  international  community  and  the 
government. an open and transparent compact of 
this nature would set a good example for the dealings 
of  the  post-conflict  government  with  its  citizens 
more generally.
2. EXPLICITLy RECONSIDER HOw THE 
CONVENTION ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS IS INTERPRETED 
AND CLEARLy DELIMIT THE EXTENT OF TAX 
EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION.
The  Convention  on  privileges  and  Immunities  of 
the United nations was crafted 60 years ago, and 
many of its provisions have been extended to the 
international  community  more  broadly.  These 
provisions were designed before the advent of today’s 
complex  and  multi-dimensional  peace  operations. 
There is need for a systematic reinterpretation of the 
convention regarding the extent of exemptions for 
United nations missions and, by extension, bilateral 
missions, international agencies, and mission affiliates 
(international and local contractors) from local taxes, 
fees, and user charges.
3. REMOVE EXEMPTIONS ON PERSONAL INCOME 
TAX FOR FOREIGN CONTRACTORS AND THEIR 
FOREIGN EMPLOyEES wHEN DOUbLE TAXATION 
AGREEMENTS OR SIMILAR PROVISIONS ARE 
IN PLACE. wHERE THERE ARE NO SUCH 
AGREEMENTS, wORk TO INTRODUCE THEM.
a  significant  area  of  confusion  involves  the  tax 
liabilities  of  foreign  contractors  and  their  foreign 
staff  when  there  are  double-taxation  agreements 
or similar provisions. Granting a tax exemption in Public Finance in Post-Conflict Environments
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these situations simply reduces the tax paid in the 
post-conflict country while increasing the tax paid 
in the home country. When foreign contractors and 
their foreign employees are following the laws of 
both their home jurisdiction and the post-conflict 
jurisdiction, then on financial grounds they should be 
indifferent to whether they receive a tax exemption 
or not. moreover, the cost of the aid project will be 
unchanged, because the net return to the law-abiding 
contractor or employee will be unchanged by the 
removal of the tax exemptions.
4. wHERE DONOR COUNTRIES PROVIDE 
bUDGET SUPPORT, REMOVE THEIR 
CONTRACTORS’ TAX EXEMPTIONS AND REDUCE 
DIRECT bUDGET SUPPORT COMMENSURATE 
wITH THE TAXES PAID.
Tax exemptions for contractors and their employees 
create excessive complexity, undermine the integrity 
of the revenue system, hamper the development of 
local businesses,   and deprive the state of an important 
potential source of revenue in a time of few options.   
removing these exemptions and counting taxes paid 
by  contractors  toward  budget-support  aid  would 
help  to  build  the  revenue  administration  system 
and would have positive demonstration effects. This 
would not change the total amount of aid provided, 
but simply alter the way it is provided to help build 
the state’s revenue-generation capacity.
5. INTRODUCE A TAX ON LAND HOLDING IN  
URbAN AREAS.
land  taxation  is  relatively  easy  to  administer  and 
relatively hard to evade. such a tax can be based 
on value or simply on size. The focus should be on 
urban land for reasons of both scarce administrative 
capacity and social equity. The fact that the tenure 
of  the  land  is  often  in  dispute  in  post-conflict 
environments can actually facilitate introduction of a 
land taxation system, since the power of landowners 
in  established  political  systems  is  less  fractured. 
people making claims on disputed land would do so 
understanding that a successful claim brings with it 
a tax liability. 
CONCLUSIONS
post-conflict  revenue  authorities  face  a  twin 
challenge – to generate increased domestic revenue 
to meet pressing needs and to build a system for 
sustainable revenue  mobilization  in  the  future.  If 
the international community can more effectively 
support  these  tasks,  the  stability  and  fiscal 
sustainability of post-conflict states will increase.  
a useful step in this direction would be to convene 
a meeting of interested participants to consider the 
taxation treatment of the international community 
in  the  broader  development  context. This  could 
be  organized  under  the  auspices  of  the  oeCD’s 
Development  assistance  Committee,  the  Un 
peacebuilding Commission, or the ImF. In a calm 
environment,  the  detrimental  impacts  of  tax 
exemptions  can  be  considered  and  informed 
choices made to reach a consistent interpretation 
of these issues. In the course of these discussions, 
other proposals presented in this paper, including 
the topics of double-taxation agreements and the 
provision of budget support, can also be considered. 
a  package  of  policy  options  could  then  be  put 
together  that  would  strengthen  the  capacity  of 
revenue authorities to do their job in raising the 
resources necessary to meet the urgent spending 






Three  key  elements  determine  the  effectiveness 
of  revenue  generation  in  any  state:  policies  that 
determine the rates of taxation; the things that are 
taxable and the things that are exempt; the revenue 
administration system, which is the way in which 
the policies are implemented and revenue is actually 
collected;  and  the  extent  of  economic  activity, 
the  things  that  can  be  taxed.  In  a  post-conflict 
environment  each  of  these  elements  has  been 
adversely affected. 
These  difficulties  are  compounded  by  three 
additional factors. First, the capacity of the state to 
reform its policies and its institutions is weak, so 
progress is likely to be slow and difficult. second, 
there is pressure from the international community 
to increase domestic revenue collection to reduce 
reliance on external budget support. Finally, while   
this  pressure  can,  and  has  been  used  by  some 
domestic leaders to push for needed reforms, the 
policies  adopted  by  the  international  community 
in their own operations often undermine revenue 
collection  and  the  building 
of  a  sustainable  revenue 
collection system. 
There  is  an  intimate  link 
between an effective system 
of public finance and other 
dimensions of statebuilding. 
The  use  of  domestic  revenue  to  fund  essential 
public  goods  such  as  health,  education  and  basic 
infrastructure is at the heart of the social contract 
between the citizen and the state.  In the absence 
of broad political support for the administration and 
acceptance of its legitimacy, there will be so much 
willful non-compliance with tax policies that even 
draconian enforcement efforts will yield very limited 
revenues.  Without  a  functioning  security  sector, 
the enforcement and compliance activities needed 
to  operate  a  revenue  system  will  be  inadequate. 
moreover, in the absence of revenue collection the 
security  sectors  will  look  to  finance  themselves 
through unofficial means. 
This paper examines options for revenue generation 
in  a  post-conflict  environment.  It  begins  with  a 
short  summary  of  the  elements  and  goals  of  a 
revenue  system,  a  brief  comparison  of  revenue 
collection across different groups of countries, and 
a review of the policies and reforms that have been 
implemented in recent post-conflict environments 
to enhance revenue collection. against this setting, 
the remainder of the paper outlines three specific 
ways  in  which  revenue  collection  could  be 
enhanced and a sustainable revenue system could 
be  built:  by  providing  direct  incentives  through 
budget support for enhanced revenue collection, 
by  restructuring  the  taxation  treatment  of  the 
international community, and by focusing on land 
taxation in the post-conflict setting. 
wHAT IS A REVENUE SySTEM  
AND wHAT SHOULD IT DO? 
Governments raise revenues so that they can spend 
the money to fund the provision of public goods 
such as law and order, public health, and education1.   
In designing a revenue system the most important 
consideration  is  ensuring  that  there  is  adequate 
revenue to meet these essential needs. a range of 
other factors is considered 
desirable.  The  system 
should  be  simple  so  that 
the administrative cost and 
the cost of compliance to 
citizens are low. simplicity 
and  transparency  also 
reduce  corruption  and  make  tax  avoidance  more 
difficult.  The  revenue  system  should  also  be 
economically neutral in that it should not favor one 
activity over another – this is regularly referred to as 
*michael Carnahan is a visiting fellow at the Crawford school of economics 
and Government, australian national University. he served as senior adviser 
to the minister of Finance in afghanistan in 2002–04, and as director of the 
Budget office in the east Timor Transitional administration in 2000–01. he 
has also worked in the Departments of Treasury and Finance in the australian 
Government.
1/  For a longer and more general discussion see, for example, nicholas stern,  
“aspects of the General Theory of Taxation,” in n. stern and D. newbery eds.  
The Theory of Taxation in Developing Countries (new York: oxford University 
press, 1987). 
The use of domestic revenue to fund 
essential public goods such as health, 
education and basic infrastructure 
is at the heart of the social contract 
between the citizen and the state. Public Finance in Post-Conflict Environments
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having a broad base (i.e. tax all economic activities) 
with  a  low  rate. Whenever  any  economic  activity 
is exempted from taxes it means that all remaining 
activities must be taxed at a higher rate in order to 
collect the same amount of revenue. 
The government must have the capacity to estimate 
the amount of revenue that will be collected under 
the  existing  legislation,  enact  legislative  changes 
if  this  revenue  needs  to  be  increased,  and  then 
administer  the  revenue  system  to  ensure  that 
the  revenue  is  actually  collected.  estimating  the 
available revenue involves analyzing the collections 
data  from  previous  years,  estimating  changes  in 
major  macroeconomic  parameters  (such  as  GDp 
and inflation) and then estimating the likely impact 
on revenue collections. 
There  are  four  key  elements  in  taxation 
administration:  registering  and  accounting  for 
payments  from  taxpayers;  annual  assessments 
and reconciliation of amounts paid by taxpayers 
with  overall  obligations;  taxpayer  education  and 
enforcement,  which  generally  focuses  on  large 
taxpayers;  and  an  active  program  of  audits  and 
court-based prosecutions. Customs administration 
also  involves  valuation  of  goods,  determining 
eligibility for exemption, controls of import quotas, 
and physically examining goods. 
THE CONTEXT: REVENUE COLLECTIONS  
IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES
The  experiences  of  revenue  collection  in  post-
conflict and developed countries are very different. 
on average,  revenue systems in low-income countries 
tap a much lower share of economic activity than in 
higher-income countries, and post-conflict countries 
are  often  below  the  low-income  country  average. 
Figure 1 presents the level of revenue in relation to 
GDp in the eU, oeCD, low-income countries, and 
select post-conflict countries.2
2/  Timor-leste is an exception because of oil and gas revenues, but other revenue 
in the country is less than nine percent of GDp.
FIGURE 1: REVENUE/GDP 
source:  Data for oeCD and eU are from OECD in Figures, 2005; aggregate 
low-income country data are from World Bank World Development Indicators 
database; country data are from ImF article IV consultation reports or 
statistical annexes. all refer to most recent year for which data are available.
a second feature is the balance between indirect and 
direct taxation. Indirect taxation (that is taxation of 
goods and services), including trade taxes, services 
taxes  and  consumption  taxes,  generally  requires 
a  lower  level  of  administrative  capacity  than 
direct taxation (that is taxation of income), which 
includes personal and company income taxation.  In 
developed economies around 60 percent of revenue 
is collected from direct taxation, with less than a 
third  from  indirect  taxation  (and  the  remainder 
from  non-tax  revenues).  In  post-conflict  countries 
these figures typically are reversed with around half 
(and in some cases considerably more) coming from 
indirect  taxes  and  less  than  a  third  coming  from 
direct taxes. This also reflects the fact that in many 
post-conflict economies the formal sector (on which 
income  taxes  could  be  levied)  is  relatively  small, 
with much of the population engaged in subsistence 
agriculture.  Figure  2  highlights  the  comparatively 
high  reliance  of  post-conflict  countries  on  trade 
taxes, a subset of indirect taxes.
FIGURE 2: TRADE TAXES AS % OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE
source: ImF article IV reports for sierra leone, liberia and DrC; other 
figures from K. Fukasaku, Fiscal Impact of Trade Liberalization: A Review 
of Recent  Country Experiences in Africa, oeCD Development Centre.
RECENT EFFORTS TO INCREASE  
REVENUE IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS
efforts  to  support  the  mobilization  of  domestic 
revenue have been undertaken in most post-conflict Public Finance in Post-Conflict Environments
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environments. This section presents a summary of   
the  most  common  approaches  taken.   The  efforts 
involve both trying to improve the policy environment 
and trying to improve administrative capacity. 
IMPROVING REVENUE POLICIES
The  first  area  of  focus  has  been  on  improving 
revenue collections from indirect taxes, particularly 
taxes collected at the borders. major reforms have 
focused  on  simplification  of  the  number  of  tariff 
rates,  number  of  classifications,  and  extent  of 
exemptions.  In afghanistan,  for  example,  25  tariff 
rates that ranged from seven to 150 percent were 
replaced with a simplified six-rate structure.4 
a second way in which revenue collections from 
border  taxes  have  been  enhanced  is  through 
improved  exchange  rate  policies.  In  many 
post-conflict  countries  the  exchange  rate  used  to 
value  goods  for  customs  purposes  is  artificial.  In 
afghanistan,  where  the  real  exchange  rate  was 
around 40 afghanis to the Us dollar, at the border an 
artificial rate of 4.5 afghanis to the dollar was used. 
By virtue of the resulting undervaluation of imports, 
the effective duty collected was around one-tenth of 
the nominal tariff. moreover, border posts engaged 
in  de  facto  competition  by  offering  even  more 
attractive  exchange  rates.  moving  to  the  market 
exchange rate for valuation purposes was a critical 
part of the overall customs reform package. similarly, 
in lebanon and rwanda a key ImF recommendation 
was  the  alignment  of  the  customs  exchange  rate 
with the market rate. 
as a short-term measure, a  tax  on  exports  also 
has  been  proposed  in  some  countries  such  as 
liberia, Timor-leste,  and Tajikistan.  In  general,  this 
has been proposed in situations where one or two 
commodities  constituted  the  bulk  of  the  exports 
and production in these areas was rapidly restored 
/  Within the international development community primary responsibility for 
supporting post-conflict countries in developing their revenue-raising capabilities lies 
with the International monetary Fund. This section of the paper draws on “rebuilding 
Fiscal Institutions in post-Conflict Countries” prepared by the ImF’s Fiscal affairs 
Division, December 2004 (http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/2005/022505.pdf).
4/  For a more detailed discussion of the reforms in afghanistan, see “Fiscal 
management in afghanistan: major achievements and Current Challenges” in 
m. Carnahan and n. manning, reforming Fiscal and economic management 
in afghanistan (World Bank, 2004). In august 2006, the six-rate structure was 
expanded to a ten-rate structure.
after the conflict. While there were concerns over 
the distortionary impacts of such a tax, including 
discouraging  investment  in  export  sectors  with 
associated risks to the balance of payments, such 
taxes were seen as necessary in the aftermath of the 
conflict – when there were few other options. When 
the capacity to introduce a broader income tax, 
including on the incomes of exporters, is in place, 
the export tax can be removed. In Timor-leste, for 
example, a tax on the export of coffee was put in 
place in the immediate post-conflict period to raise 
revenue, but it was removed when a general income 
tax was implemented. 
In  many  cases,  taxes  on  services  consumed 
predominantly  by  expatriates  (restaurants,  hotels, 
and telecoms) have been proposed. For example in 
Kosovo and Timor-leste, a services tax of 10 percent 
was imposed on these three items. Vehicle rentals 
were also taxed in Timor-leste.  a turnover threshold 
ensured that businesses catering for local customers 
were  exempt.  The  small  number  of  businesses 
servicing the international community provides an 
easily identifiable tax base. This is one way in which 
the international community has been taxed. This 
helps lay a foundation for a broader consumption 
tax when the administrative capacity can support 
broadening of the base. 
on  the  direct  taxation  side,  in  most  countries 
some  form  of  income  taxation  was  proposed,   
even  though  such  taxes  are  more  difficult  to 
administer. The major reason for introducing them 
early  is  the  political  difficulties  associated  with 
introducing them at a later stage when people are 
not accustomed to paying income tax. Where there 
was an existing income-tax regime, in countries such 
as Cambodia, lebanon, and Tajikistan, recommended 
reforms  included  harmonizing  and  reducing  tax 
rates to increase compliance and base-broadening 
through  the  removal  of  exemptions.  a  common 
form of income tax in the early post-conflict period 
has been a flat withholding tax on wages (e.g.,   
in albania,  Bosnia  and  herzegovina,  and  Kosovo), 
which  is  relatively  easy  to  administer  in  a  formal 
workforce  dominated  by  civil  servants  and 
international organizations. Public Finance in Post-Conflict Environments
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a  range  of  measures  also  have  been  proposed 
for  taxing  business  income.  These  included 
presumptive taxes on income for small businesses in 
Timor-leste and Kosovo, based on factors including 
the type of product sold, the size of the enterprise, 
and a rough estimate of turnover. The revenue yield 
from  these  taxes  was  not  anticipated  to  be  high 
initially.  however,  again  there  is  an  imperative  to 
introduce a tax system to encourage a culture of 
compliance  from  the  start  –  especially  in  sectors 
expected to grow. 
IMPROVING REVENUE ADMINISTRATION
several measures have been undertaken to restore 
revenue  administration  in  post-conflict  contexts. 
The  first  priority  typically  is  to  establish  the 
basic  infrastructure  for  a  functioning  revenue 
administration,  including  buildings  and  equipment. 
In  new  countries  or  territories  such  as Timor-leste, 
Kosovo, or Bosnia and herzegovina, the requirements 
included physically sound buildings, telephone lines, 
and vehicles. another key piece of infrastructure was 
a  basic  information  management  system  able 
to produce revenue statistics and monitor operations. 
The  second  step  was  the  appointment  of  essential 
senior staff. 
operationally,  the  first  step 
involves  registration  and 
identification of taxpayers. 
In  many  cases  (e.g.,  liberia, 
serbia  and  montenegro, 
Kosovo,  rwanda,  Timor-
leste) this involved registering each taxpayer with a 
unique taxpayer identification number. This number 
was  the  basis  for  filing  returns  and  cross-checking 
data. administration was also improved by simplifying 
the procedures through which tax returns were filed, 
or instituting simple procedures in the case of new 
administrations. 
an  initial  focus  of  domestic  authorities  in  many 
post-conflict  countries  (e.g.,  Kosovo,  Timor-leste, 
afghanistan),  with  international  support,  has  been 
strengthening  the  customs  administration, 
reflecting  the  need  to  increase  actual  revenue 
collections as rapidly as possible. maintaining the focus 
on high-yielding areas of administration, the authorities, 
again  with  international  support,  also  have  created 
large-taxpayer units, concentrating on the relatively 
small number of taxpayers who are likely to have the 
largest tax bills. establishing these units has often been 
challenging because of the lack of a qualified pool of 
tax officials to effectively audit large taxpayers. 
These  efforts  to  improve  revenue  collection 
performance  in  post-conflict  environments  have 
achieved considerable incremental progress in many 
of the countries mentioned  above.  however,  these 
reforms alone have rarely been successful in rapidly 
placing post-conflict states on a path to fiscal self-
sufficiency—a critical determinant for sovereignty.
one reason is that they have failed to confront some 
of the key challenges created by the international 
system, discussed below. 
THREE NEw OPTIONS TO ENHANCE 
REVENUE GENERATION
The remainder of this paper advances three specific 
options to enhance revenue generation in post-conflict 
countries. The first option would alter the way that 
existing budget support is provided so as to create a 
direct incentive for domestic policy-makers to improve 
revenue  policies  and 
administration.  The  second 
option  is  to  revisit  policies 
around  the  taxation  of  the 
international  community 
in  post-conflict  countries, 
with  a  focus  on  building 
the  capacity  of  the  revenue  administration  system, 
not  simply  to  raise  revenues. The  final  option  is  to 
increase land taxation, on the grounds that during post-
war economic recovery taxing stocks of assets may be 
preferable to trying to tax limited flows of economic 
activity. 
1. CHANGE THE wAy bUDGET SUPPORT 
IS PROVIDED by DONORS
The  first  option  for  enhancing  domestic  revenue 
generation  is  to  introduce  a  modality  where  budget 
support  is  provided  to  post-conflict  countries 
through a matching funds formula.5
5/  This discussion only focuses on the external assistance that is pledged to 
recipient countries in the form of budget support, generally through multilateral 
trust funds. In general, a far greater portion of funds are routed around the 
government through a parallel external public sector.
however, these reforms alone have 
rarely been successful in rapidly 
placing post-conflict states on a path 
to fiscal self-sufficiency—a critical 
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This approach sharpens the government’s incentive 
to raise domestic revenue and to manage expenditure 
responsibly.  From  a  broader  state-building 
perspective  it  also  introduces  more  predictable 
financing,  frees  up  the  time  of  the  domestic 
leadership to focus on reforms, and allows for far 
more effective cash management. These support the 
more effective operation of the state, and through 
this the provision of a stronger enabling environment 
for the private sector. The associated growth then   
provides a stronger revenue base going forward.  
Immediately after conflict, countries find themselves 
with a weak revenue system and a weak economy 
and are rarely able to fund the basic operations of 
the state – such as paying salaries. often domestic 
revenues cover less than half of routine operating 
expenses.6  The remainder of the funds are provided 
by  donor  countries  in  the 
form  of  budget  support. 
Budget  support  is  often 
managed  through  a 
multilateral trust fund with 
an  international  agency 
as  the  trustee,  such  as  the 
afghanistan  reconstruction 
Trust  Fund  (arTF  – World 
Bank as trustee) or the law and order Trust Fund 
for afghanistan (loTFa – UnDp as trustee), or the 
UnTaeT Consolidated Fund for east Timor (CFeT – 
Un as trustee). In some cases budget support is also 
provided as direct bilateral assistance. What happens 
in practice is that the domestic authorities prepare a 
budget outlining a proposed spending program and 
identify a financing gap. The budget and financing 
gap are presented at a donor meeting, where donors 
pledge – with varying degrees of commitment – to 
meet the financing gap. over the course of the next 
year, the finance minister and their colleagues spend 
a considerable amount of time trying to translate the 
pledges of donors into actual cash disbursements in 
a timely enough fashion to meet the ongoing cash 
needs of the government’s operations.7  
6/   For example in the case of Timor-leste for the first two post-conflict years,  
domestic revenue covered 7 percent of operating expenditure, while in 
afghanistan the figure was 4 percent.
7/  The examples here are built on the author’s experience as the director of the 
Budget office, Central Fiscal authority, in Timor-leste and senior adviser to the 
afghan minister of Finance. The situation is similar in many other post-conflict 
There  are  several  negative  consequences  of  this 
modality of supporting the operation of the post-
conflict  government.  First,  the  incentive  for  the 
government to actually raise revenue is diminished. 
Taxing  people  is  an  unpopular  task  for  any 
government. In a post-conflict environment with an 
inexperienced cabinet, the notion of raising tax rates 
or introducing new taxes to raise revenue is a very 
hard sell. Donors are seen as a much softer touch, and 
so difficult decisions to raise revenue are not taken. 
The second problem with the provision of budget 
support in this way is that the opportunity is lost 
to  build  the  capacity  of  the  new  government  to 
handle the difficult macro-level expenditure-revenue 
trade-offs, or even the trade-offs among competing 
expenditure  priorities.  In  most  governments,  the 
level  of  expenditure  is  set  largely  by  the  amount 
of  revenue  that  can  be 
raised.  In  the  post-conflict 
environment,  the  trade-off 
between  raising  taxes  or 
reducing  expenditure  is 
lost  when  opportunistic 
ministers  simply  argue 
that  spending  should  be 
increased  –  so  the  budget 
becomes a wish list presented to donors, not a tool 
that  prioritizes  across  competing  needs.  Donors 
will not explicitly say no; they just won’t contribute. 
Thus, unnecessary uncertainty is introduced into the 
budget process. 
The third problem is the impact of the uncertainty 
associated with donor pledges and contributions on 
the cash-management task during budget execution. 
In a post-conflict country there is rarely any scope for 
borrowing to meet ongoing operational expenses. 
In  this  environment,  the  ability  to  effectively 
manage the cash of the government is critical. The 
uncertainty  surrounding  the  timing  and  arrival  of 
donor pledges into budget support trust funds means 
that predictable budget execution is not possible. 
environments. For discussion, see s. Forman and s. patrick, eds., Good Intentions: 
Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery (Boulder: lynne rienner, 2000). 
The trade-off between raising taxes 
or reducing expenditure is lost when 
opportunistic ministers simply argue 
that spending should be increased 
– so the budget becomes a wish list 
presented to donors, not a tool that 
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PROPOSAL 1: DONORS ENTER INTO A  
MULTI-yEAR COMPACT wITH THE HOST 
GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE MATCHING FUNDS 
FOR DIRECT bUDGET SUPPORT PURPOSES. 
To address these concerns, donors could agree to 
match a percentage of the funds collected by the 
host government up to a fixed limit. The matching 
percentage could be reduced over time, reflecting 
the  increasing  capacity  of 
the host government to raise 
revenue,  and  the  expected 
increase in economic activity 
and  therefore  the  tax  base. 
an example is presented in 
the table below. 









1 100 200% 200 300
2 150 150% 225 375
3 200 100% 200 400
4 250 75% 187 437
5 300 50% 150 450
6 400 25% 100 500
7 500 20% 100 600
In  the  first  couple  of  post-conflict  years,  donors 
commit  to  significantly  higher  levels  of  budget 
support  as  a  percentage  of  domestic  revenue, 
reflecting  both  the  lower  domestic  capacity  to 
raise and spend, and the importance of providing 
strong  incentives  for  domestic  policymakers  to 
take  responsible  taxation  decisions.  operationally, 
the likely levels of domestic revenues, and the sorts 
of levels that would constitute appropriate stretch 
targets, could be agreed upon by ImF officials and 
donors. 
In practice, the system would involve the creation 
of  a  trust  fund  into  which  donors  would  make 
contributions.  The  details  of  the  agreement 
establishing the trust would specify its operations, 
but the simplest operation would involve monthly 
certification of the changes, in the balance of the 
ministry of finance general revenue account at the 
central bank by an independent authority and then, 
based on these changes the automatic disbursement 
from the trust fund of the agreed amount into the 
revenue account.
The creation of this system would provide an impetus 
for a number of essential improvements in the public 
finance  architecture  in  the 
post-conflict  environment. 
The primary advantage is that 
it places the incentive fairly 
and  squarely  on  domestic 
authorities to make responsible decisions in relation 
to domestic revenue mobilization. rather than the 
crowding-out effect of traditional budget support, the 
matching funds approach has a crowding-in effect, 
heightening the incentive for revenue collection. In 
the early post-conflict years, recipient governments 
would know that each additional dollar of revenue 
that they raise actually provides them with an extra 
two or three dollars for domestic spending. In this 
way  the  domestic  demand  for  revenue-enhancing 
reforms – the critical ingredient for their success – is 
heightened.  moreover,  a  matching-funds  approach 
sharpens  the  link  between  revenue  raising  and 
increasing  expenditure,  provides  much  greater 
certainty  to  facilitate  building  stronger  cash-flow 
skills in the treasury, and reduces the drain on the 
time now spent by the finance minister and senior 
officials  in  chasing  donors  to  turn  pledges  into 
disbursements. 
The major challenge of such an approach involves 
the preparedness of donors to make their aid flows 
predictable  and  reliable  –  putting  into  practice 
agreements on good donor practices made in such 
statements as the 2005 paris Declaration8  or the 
DaC principles for Good International engagement 
in Fragile states9.  The provision of funds in this way 
8/ The paris Declaration, endorsed on 2 march 2005, is an international agreement 
in which over 100 ministers, heads of agencies and other senior officials 
committed their countries and organizations to continue and increase their 
efforts on harmonization, alignment and managing aid for results with a set of 
monitorable actions and indicators.  
see http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/442851.pdf.
9/ These principles were prepared following discussions at the January 2005 
oeCD senior level Forum on Development effectiveness in Fragile states to 
build on the growing consensus about aid effectiveness.  
see http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/4700989.pdf. 
The major challenge of such an 
approach involves the preparedness 
of donors to make their aid flows 
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requires a greater degree of planning and discipline 
in donor operations than has been demonstrated in 
post-conflict environments to date. While a matching 
funds  approach  removes  the  opportunity  to  use 
individual budget contributions as a direct incentive 
to  micro-manage  the  post-conflict  government,  a 
matching trust fund can be part of a broader compact 
between  the  international  community  and  the 
post-conflict government. an open and transparent 
compact of this nature sets a good example for the 
dealings  of  the  post-conflict  government  with  its 
citizens more generally. 
2. TAXATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITy
In  any  post-conflict  setting,  the  operations  of  the 
international community, including the emergency 
and  humanitarian  activities,  reconstruction 
activities,  and  the  general  level  of  economic 
activity associated with an increased international 
presence, represent a large share of the economic 
activity.  Where  subsistence  agriculture  represents 
another large share of the economy, the activities 
of the international community represent an even 
larger  share  of  the  formal  economy.  In  its  report 
on “rebuilding  Fiscal  Institutions  in  post-Conflict 
Countries,” the ImF notes: 
most  post-conflict  countries  experienced  a  large  influx  of 
expatriates in connection with relief and reconstruction work. 
In  general  these  incomes  were  exempt  from  taxation. The 
differential treatment of expatriates risked creating a culture of 
tax exemptions and made it more difficult to implement a simple 
tax system where all taxpayers faced a level playing field.10  
Taxing the activities of the international community 
is a very emotive issue, with passionate views held 
by  many  stakeholders.  It  is  also  an  area  where 
there  is  a  considerable  degree  of  confusion  and 
misunderstanding.  The  discussion  that  follows  is 
intended to address some of these misunderstandings 
and clear up some of the confusion. The first part 
provides  some  background  on  the  privileges  and 
immunities enjoyed by the United nations – which 
are  generally  used  by  other  international  players 
as  a  benchmark  for  their  own  concessions.  The 
10/ ImF FaD op cit, para 44. 
consequences of administering these exemptions in 
the post-conflict setting are then examined. Foregone 
revenue  is  one  concern,  but  a  bigger  concern  is 
the  damage  that  is  done  to  the  fragile  revenue 
administration and the lost opportunity to build a 
more robust system. The third part addresses some 
of  the  most  common  objections  raised  by  those 
opposed  to  paying  taxes. The  final  part  presents 
some concrete ways to support revenue generation 
from the international community. 
bACkGROUND
In  dealing  with  revenue  authorities  in  host 
countries,  the  international  community  regularly 
situates its arguments within the Convention on the 
privileges and Immunities of the United nations.11 
The convention provides a clear set of immunities 
to  the  United  nations  and  its  staff.  The  United 
nations  is  exempt  from  all  direct  taxes  (such  as 
income taxes), but will not claim exemptions from 
charges for use of public utilities (section 7a). It is 
exempt from customs duties (section 7b), but will 
not as a rule claim exemption from excise duties 
(section 8). International Un staff shall be exempt 
from  taxation  on  their  salaries  (section  18b)  and 
have the right to import their furniture and effects 
free of duty when first taking up their posting, but 
they are not exempt from customs or excise duties 
on other goods imported for personal consumption. 
The convention makes no reference to the taxation 
treatment  of  national  staff  or  contractors  to  the 
United nations, nor does it refer to the Un’s system 
of “staff assessment.”12  
When the Un mission is operating in a country with a 
sovereign government, a further set of privileges and 
11/  The Convention on the privileges and Immunities of the United nations was 
adopted by the General assembly on 1 February 1946. most, if not all, bilateral 
agencies include a clause in their country agreements that guarantees them 
privileges and immunities that are “no less than” those enjoyed by the United 
nations. hence the focus here is on the convention.
12/ staff assessment is sometimes characterized as a form of internal “tax” 
administered by the United nations. Un staff salaries are expressed in gross 
and net amounts. The difference (the assessment) is not paid like a regular tax. 
rather it is deposited into the Un’s Tax equalization Fund, the purpose of which 
is to ensure horizontal equity for those employees who are liable to pay income 
tax because they are citizens of the handful of countries that have not signed 
the convention. The fund is used to offset tax payments by these employees 
and to offset financial obligations to support United nations operations for 
those countries that are signatories to the convention. In effect, signatories pay 
lower Un dues while non-signatories pay higher dues and their citizens are 
compensated for being subject to income taxation. Public Finance in Post-Conflict Environments
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immunities are contained in the agreement between 
the host government and the Un that establishes 
the  mission. a  model  status  of  forces  agreement 
(soFa) presented to the General assembly in 1990 
(a/45/594)  has  been  the  basis  for  many  of  these 
agreements. This  model  confirms  the  convention 
but also extends it to add several other immunities, 
including the right to establish a commissary which 
can import goods free of duty for resale to members 
of  the  peacekeeping  operation  and  the  right  to 
purchase goods and services 
locally free from sales taxes. It 
also obliges the government 
to  provide  accommodation 
to the mission free of charge; 
to provide water, electricity, 
and  other  utilities  free  of 
charge or at the most favorable rate; and to grant 
locally  recruited  staff  immunity  from  taxation.1   
The taxation treatment of contractors or their staff 
again is not covered. In afghanistan the model was 
extended specifically to grant tax exemptions to Un 
contractors, other than local contractors.
The model soFa thus establishes greater concessions 
than are included in the original convention. Country-
specific  agreements  are  generally  negotiated  to 
maximize the extent of exemptions and concessions. 
a real concern is that the host government finds itself 
in a very weak position, needing the peacekeeping 
mission  to  establish  basic 
security, and so it is prepared 
to  agree  to  whatever 
conditions are presented.14 
When there is no host 
government, as in Timor- 
leste or Kosovo, there is even less 
counterbalancing force to limit the immunities. 
1/  There are, of course, anomalies in the application of even such routine 
requirements. For example, in sierra leone, the government had previously leased 
the building most suitable for Un mission headquarters to a private party, who 
was not bound by security Council requirements and whom the mission then 
paid to sub-lease the building. In the absence of the government’s initial lease, 
the mission would have occupied the building rent-free. Under the prevailing 
arrangement, however, the government received both rent and taxes from its 
lessee, and the Un’s sub-lease covered both.
14/   see, for example, m. de Brito, The relationship between peacekeepers, host 
Governments and the local population, monograph 10, Conflict management, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, United nations research Institute for social 
Development (www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs), for comments on the 
negotiations between the mozambican Government and onUmoZ.
CONSEqUENCES 
Tax exemptions have several negative consequences 
for  the  host  economy.  They  directly  reduce  the 
state’s revenue – because taxes are not paid. Indeed, 
given that the major economic activity in the early 
years of post-conflict recovery revolves around the 
international community, exemptions of this nature 
remove the major potential source of revenue. even 
more problematic, however, is the damage caused to 
the integrity of the revenue 
administration  system.  In 
situations  where  missions 
have  been  deployed, 
administrative  capacity  is 
generally very low and the 
bureaucracy is often poorly 
paid  and  corrupt.  In  building  an  administrative 
system that can work, there is an absolute premium 
on  both  simplicity  and  removing  discretion. 
Concessions  of  this  nature  add  an  administrative 
burden and an additional layer of complexity to an 
already weak system. In doing this, they seriously 
undermine the chances of building a revenue system 
that can operate on a sustainable basis. 
The complexity in the system is exacerbated by 
the blurred lines in regard to exemptions. There are 
relatively few who argue that international staff of 
Un missions, or international staff in donor agencies, 
should  be  liable  for  host-
country tax on the income 
they  earn.  however,  as  the 
funds  move  further  and 
further into and through the 
economy, there is a question 
of  when  the  exemption 
should be stopped.  should a contractor to a donor 
organization  be  liable  for  tax?  should  the  foreign 
employees of the contractor, or the local employees 
of the contractor, or the local employees of a sub-
contractor? should staff be exempt from indirect tax 
as well as direct tax?
This complexity is illustrated in the appendix Table 
which lists the different rules that currently apply 
to different entities in Kosovo. Tax liabilities vary for 
different organizations. They vary for depending on 
The host government finds itself in 
a very weak position, needing the 
peacekeeping mission to establish basic 
security, and so it is prepared to agree 
to whatever conditions are presented.
should a contractor to a donor 
organization be liable for tax? should the 
foreign employees of the contractor, or 
the local employees of the contractor, or 
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which organization they work for and on whether 
they are international or local staff.   They vary for the 
contractors of different organizations, and again for 
the employees of different contractors to different 
organizations, again depending on the organization 
and  whether  the  contractor  and  the  employee 
are  local  or  international. a  revenue  authority  in 
a  developed  country  would  be  criticized  for  this 
level of complexity. a revenue authority in a post-
conflict country that allocates its scarce resources to 
managing this complexity will not be able to build a 
strong administrative structure. 
The integrity of the revenue system is also damaged 
by the demonstration effect of the exemptions. In a 
weak system, compliance is a particular challenge—
especially when the court system that is needed for 
enforcement  is  also  weak. The  attitude  of  trying  to 
minimize taxation,  rather than seeing revenue collection 
as a necessary state function, is adopted by others in 
the  economy.  In  regard  to  user-charge  collections, 
for  example,  compliance  by  private  businesses  is 
compromised when the major users (foreign missions) 
claim exemptions.
Finally,  the  tax  exemptions  to  the  international 
community  hamper  the  development  of  local 
businesses.  merchants  selling  imported  goods  on 
which duty has been paid cannot compete with goods 
sold in the commissary, or with goods that have been 
imported duty-free for the international community and 
then sold privately—so these policies have the effect 
of  favoring  dishonest  businesses  over  honest  ones. 
similarly, exemptions for international contractors give 
them a competitive edge over local contractors who 
have to pay tax, again hampering the development of 
the legitimate domestic private sector. 
ARGUMENTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE 
OF EXEMPTIONS
The  major  argument  for  the  maintenance  of 
exemptions  is  more  ideological  than  logical: “We 
are  the  international  community,  here  to  help 
the country,  and we don’t pay tax.”15  It is partly 
15/  a clear example is the response of the international community when a tax 
on rental income was introduced in afghanistan. many of the most expensive 
houses in Kabul are rented by members of the international community: missions,   
their contractors, international nGos, or international staff. The income that 
landowners earn from renting their land or properties out to foreigners is 
taxable income. The Finance ministry tried to introduce a withholding regime to 
explained  by  the  fact  that  many  international 
organizations  see  themselves  fundamentally  as 
operating outside of – and in a sense, above – the 
state. many staff in international organizations do not 
understand the importance of raising revenue for the 
creation of a sustainable state, in some cases because 
their own resources come from voluntary fundraising 
appeals, not from revenue collection. moreover, the 
centrality of statebuilding to forging a durable peace 
and sustained poverty reduction remains contested 
by some. 
The second argument against taxing international 
organizations, or their contractors or staff, is that this 
will reduce the amount of money that is available 
to be spent on development projects. While often 
considered by the development community to be a 
self-evident truth, this issue needs to be considered 
more closely. It rests on an assumption that a dollar 
allocated to an aid project has a better development 
or poverty reduction impact than a dollar allocated 
to the government. This assumption needs to be 
tested empirically. There is considerable literature   
on the ineffectiveness of aid spending.16  In a situation 
where the government is allocating a large share 
of  its  funds  to  pro-poor  development  activities, 
such as teacher salaries or basic medicines, it is not 
immediately  obvious  that  removing  exemptions 
from  international  organizations  will  lead  to  less 
effective  spending  on  development  projects.   
a  related  assumption  is  that  the  government  is 
inefficient or corrupt, or both. however, payment 
of taxes helps to solve this problem by motivating 
taxpayer  pressure  for  improved  government 
performance, and this pressure would be enhanced 
if the international community also paid taxes. 
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS 
The four proposals presented below are designed 
both to allow for the removal of tax exemptions and 
collect this revenue – that is, a system where the tenants withhold the income 
tax portion on behalf of the landowners and submit that money to the revenue 
authority – in the same way that employers withhold employees’ income tax 
in many countries. In most cases the international community simply refused 
to support this approach. They claimed that asking them to withhold the tax 
payments in this way represented a tax on them and in this way violated the 
Convention on privileges and Immunity. Yet legally the tax is clearly levied on the 
income of the landowner, not on the rent paid by the tenant. 
16/ see, for example, r. rajan and a. subramanian, “aid and Growth: What does the 
cross-country evidence really show us?” ImF Working paper Wp05/127, June 2005; 
and W. easterly, The White man’s Burden: Why the West’s efforts to aid the rest 
have Done so much Ill and so little Good, (penguin press, 2006). Public Finance in Post-Conflict Environments
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to meet the concerns of the international community 
outlined above.
PROPOSAL 2: EXPLICITLy RECONSIDER HOw 
THE CONVENTION ON PRIVILEGES AND 
IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS IS 
INTERPRETED AND CLEARLy DELIMIT THE 
EXTENT OF TAX EXEMPTIONS UNDER 
THE CONVENTION.
There is need for a systematic reinterpretation of the 
Convention on the privileges and Immunities regarding 
the extent of exemptions for United nations missions 
and,  by  extension,  bilateral  missions,  international 
agencies, and mission affiliates (international and local 
contractors) from local taxes, fees, and user charges. 
The convention was crafted 60 years ago in a very 
different environment from that in which the United 
nations now operates. Today there are many more 
peacekeeping missions (only a quarter of all missions 
commenced  in  the  first  40  years  of  the  Un),  and 
peacekeeping missions have become more complex, 
involving  a  broader  array  of  activities. at  the  very 
least, there needs to be a consistent position taken 
across all missions, but the re-interpretation should 
also be mindful of the expanded role that agencies 
of the international community play in the security, 
political development, and economic development of 
the territories where they operate. 
presently the same debates are rehashed every time 
a post-conflict reconstruction mission is established. 
The Un legal office had the same arguments with the 
revenue authority in Kosovo as it had with the east 
Timor revenue service. It had the same arguments 
with  the  ministry  of  Finance  in  afghanistan. This 
repetition  is  wasteful  in  both  time  and  resources. 
What is needed instead is a broader dialogue, possibly 
through the new peacebuilding Commission of the 
Un, with involvement from the ImF and World Bank. 
This discussion needs to be held outside the cut and 
thrust of an individual post-conflict context. In this 
discussion, analysis of the broader consequences of 
the inconsistent and opportunistic application of the 
convention can be undertaken. Then the convention 
could  be  applied  consistently  in  each  new  post-
conflict environment. 
PROPOSAL 3: REMOVE EXEMPTIONS ON 
PERSONAL INCOME TAX FOR FOREIGN 
CONTRACTORS AND THEIR FOREIGN 
EMPLOyEES wHEN DOUbLE TAXATION 
AGREEMENTS OR SIMILAR PROVISIONS ARE 
IN PLACE. wHERE THERE ARE NO SUCH 
AGREEMENTS, wORk TO INTRODUCE THEM. 
a  significant  area  of  confusion  involves  the  tax 
liabilities of foreign contractors and their foreign staff 
when there are double-taxation agreements or similar 
provisions in place.  Consider the following example 
of a contractor who earns $100,000 for work in a 
post-conflict country.17 let the income tax rate in their 
home country be 0 percent, and the tax rate in the 
post-conflict country be 20 percent18.  The tax liability 
with and without the exemption is presented below: 






1. Income 100,000 100,000








4. Tax credit for 
foreign tax paid
0 20,000
5. Actual tax 
paid in home 
country (=3-4)
30,000 10,000
6. Total tax paid 
(=2+5)
30,000 30,000
Granting a tax exemption in these situations simply 
reduces the tax paid in the post-conflict country while 
increasing the tax paid in the home country. When 
foreign contractors and their foreign employees are 
17/  This example applies equally to a contractor seeking a business-income 
or profit tax exemption and to the employee seeking a personal-income tax 
exemption.
18/  The marginal income tax rates in post-conflict countries have regularly been 
set well below the marginal income tax rates that apply in oeCD countries.Public Finance in Post-Conflict Environments
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following the laws of both their home jurisdiction 
and the post-conflict jurisdiction, then on financial 
grounds  they  should  be  indifferent  to  whether 
they receive a tax exemption or not. moreover, the 
cost of the aid project will be unchanged, because 
the  net  return  to  the  law-abiding  contractor  or 
employee will be unchanged by the removal of the 
tax exemptions.
In  the  absence  of  double-taxation  agreements, 
revenue authorities in donor jurisdictions may not 
recognize taxes paid to revenue authorities in post-
conflict countries as legitimate taxation payments. 
In this case, removing the tax exemption will indeed 
increase  the  costs  of  doing  business.  however, 
following on from proposal 2, supporting domestic 
revenue mobilization involves putting processes in 
place to ensure that the revenue authorities in the 
donor  countries  do  recognize  these  payments  as 
legitimate  taxation  payments.  officials  from  the 
finance ministries and treasuries of donor countries 
regularly engage with the advisers and officials from 
the post-conflict ministries of finance and revenue 
authorities.  a valuable form of assistance would be 
if these officials from the donor countries worked 
with  their  colleagues  at  home  to  ensure  that 
credit was given for tax paid in the post-conflict 
jurisdiction. In this way, the tax exemptions could 
be removed with less complaint. 
PROPOSAL 4: wHERE DONOR COUNTRIES 
PROVIDE bUDGET SUPPORT, REMOVE 
THEIR CONTRACTORS’ TAX EXEMPTIONS 
AND REDUCE DIRECT bUDGET SUPPORT 
COMMENSURATE wITH THE TAXES PAID. 
one of the ironies in post-conflict assistance is that 
donor countries stridently argue for tax exemptions 
for  their  contractors,  claiming  that  development 
money shouldn’t just go straight into the post-conflict 
country’s treasury, yet at the same time they make 
contributions to a multilateral trust fund that makes 
payments  into  the  post-conflict  country’s  treasury. 
The primary rationale cannot be fiscal as the funds 
are spent regardless. rather it is likely to be because 
the donor country wants to be able to demonstrate its 
generosity by publicly (and loudly) announcing every 
penny it provides in budget support. however, if the 
goal is genuinely to build a stable and sustainable state, 
then those donor countries that do provide budget 
support  can  simply  alter  the  way  in  which  they 
provide their assistance to help support the creation 
of sustainable revenue institutions, without altering 
the overall direction or magnitude of their aid flows. 
Consider the example of a donor country that has 
$100 million in a variety of projects and provides $0 
million in budget support, into a trust fund. rather 
than  seek  a  tax  exemption  for  their  contractors, 
the donor could gross up the project to cover tax 
payments and reduce the amount of budget support 
by a corresponding amount. This is illustrated below. 
TOTAL ASSISTANCE TO RECIPIENT GOVERNMENT 





1. Projects executed 
by contractors
100 100
2. Tax liability 0 10
3. Budget support 30 20




5. Total amount 
of assistance
130 130
This  could  be  operationalized  quite  simply.  The 
donor agency would simply treat the payment of 
taxes by its contractors and their employees as an 
additional acquittable expense, in much the same 
way that travel or per diems are currently treated. 
When making claims for payment, contractors would 
include evidence of tax paid as part of their expense 
claims.19  In reporting their assistance to the oeCD 
Development assistance Committee, donors would 
break out tax paid for each project, report the net 
19/  If the proposals outlined above are implemented, care will need to be 
taken to ensure that firms cannot effectively “double dip” – by having their tax 
payments to the post-conflict revenue authority recognized as an acquittable 
expense and reimbursed, and then seeking credit for tax paid from the revenue 
authority in their home jurisdiction. This is an issue that could be addressed in 
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figure against the relevant sector, and then report all 
the tax paid by their contractors against the budget 
support category. 
again it should be stressed that this approach does 
not alter in any way the amount of assistance allocated 
to “development” projects – the main objection of 
those who argue for tax exemptions. nor does it alter 
the total amount of assistance provided, including 
budget support.  rather it alters the way that assistance 
is provided, to leverage additional benefits in building 
the institutions of state that will be needed for stable 
and sustainable governance. 
3. LAND TAXATION
The third proposal for revenue mobilization involves 
directly  taxing  an  economic  factor  of  production 
(land), rather than taxing economic activity or the 
use of that factor. This approach takes advantage of 
what is generally regarded as a liability, not an asset 
– the uncertainty around land tenure in post-conflict 
environments. 
post-conflict  environments  are  characterized  by 
reduced  economic  activity.  Conflict  means  that 
current demand for goods and services is less certain, 
the  infrastructure  linking  producers  to  market  is 
uncertain, and the likelihood of being in a position to 
collect the returns tomorrow on investments made 
today is reduced.
a second characteristic of post-conflict environments 
is  the  depletion  of  many  factors  of  production. 
Factors  that  are  mobile  are  often  moved  out  in 
order to generate economic returns elsewhere. The 
physical capital stock in a country in many cases has 
been degraded or destroyed by the conflict, while 
the  financial  capital  has  been  invested  in  foreign 
markets to earn safer returns. skilled labor often has 
emigrated in order to earn safer returns, and because 
skilled laborers are both more likely to be persecuted 
in conflicts and are more likely to be welcomed by 
third countries. The stock of land on the other hand, 
is immobile. so one option to mobilize revenue in the 
short to medium term is to tax the ownership of land.  
PROPOSAL 5: INTRODUCE A TAX ON 
LAND HOLDING IN URbAN AREAS.
land taxation is an option that is rarely considered 
in the post-conflict environment, often because the 
tenure  of  the  land  is  in  dispute. Yet  the  disputed 
tenure actually represents a key asset in introducing a 
land taxation system. It is often difficult to introduce 
land taxation in established political systems because 
landowners are generally a wealthy and powerful 
interest group who are well-placed to protect their 
interests. When land tenure is disputed, the power 
of this interest group becomes more fractured and 
the opportunity to introduce the tax is heightened. 
people making claims on disputed land would do so 
understanding that a successful claim brings with it 
a tax liability. 
land taxation is an excellent way to raise revenue: it 
is relatively simple to administer, and relatively hard 
to evade. The tax could either be based on the value 
of the block of land, or more simply on the size of the 
block.  a land tax based on the size of the block would 
be very simple, transparent, and hard to evade – non-
payment could simply result in seizure of the land. 
The focus of any land taxation initiative should be on 
urban land rather than on all lands for two reasons. 
First,  focus on the urban areas will be driven by scarce 
administrative capacity. revenue offices already exist 
in major urban areas and the cadastral records will 
identify land parcels more easily – even if ownership 
is disputed. second, much of the rural land is used for 
subsistence agriculture. For reasons of both equity 
and potential revenue yield, the focus should be on 
urban land.  
CONCLUSION: TIME FOR AN 
INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAkING
In  a  post-conflict  environment,  the  domestic 
authorities face a twin challenge. They must try to 
mobilize increased domestic revenue and at the same 
time build a system that will allow the mobilization 
of  adequate  revenue  on  a  sustainable  basis  into 
the  future. There  is  pressure  by  the  international 
community  to  increase  revenue  mobilization  in 
the short term.  Yet this same international system 
engages  in  practices  that  exempt  large  portions Public Finance in Post-Conflict Environments
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of  economic  activity  from  taxation,  weaken  the 
capacity of the nascent revenue administration to 
effectively do its job, and create incentives for the 
state to rely on external budget support rather than 
raise revenue domestically. 
The proposals outlined in this paper are designed 
to  improve  the  practices  of  the  international 
community  and  more  effectively  support  the 
mobilization  of  domestic  revenue.  This  can  be 
done in three complementary ways: by providing 
matching  funds  for  budget  support  purposes, 
strengthening instead of weakening the incentive 
for domestic revenue mobilization; by reconsidering 
the tax treatment of the international community,  so 
as to better tap the revenue potential in economic 
activity it generates while meeting the concerns of 
the international community; and by introducing 
taxation on urban lands.
possibly the most critical proposal is to convene a 
meeting of interested participants to consider the 
taxation treatment of the international community 
in  the  broader  development  context. This  could 
be  organized  under  the  auspices  of  the  oeCD’s 
Development assistance Committee (DaC), the new 
Un peacebuilding Commission, or the ImF.  a blanket 
approach to exemptions may have been appropriate 
in the environment in which international missions 
operated 60 years ago – but their application needs 
to be re-interpreted. In a calm environment, outside 
the hurly-burly of an individual post-conflict country, 
the detrimental impacts of tax exemptions can be 
considered  and  informed  choices  made  to  reach 
a  consistent  interpretation  of  these  issues.  If  the 
international  community  collectively  decides  to 
continue to support large exemptions, then it would 
do  so  mindful  of  the  negative  consequences  for 
domestic  resource  mobilization  and  statebuilding. 
In the course of these discussions, other proposals 
presented  in  this  paper,  including  the  topics  of 
double-taxation  agreements  and  recasting  the 
way  that  budget  support  is  administered,  can  be 
considered  together. a  package  of  options  could 
then  be  put  together  that  would  strengthen  the 
capacity of the revenue authority to do its job in 
raising the resources necessary to meet the most 
urgent spending needs of the society.   
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  TAX EXEMPTIONS AND LIAbILITy OF DIFFERENT ORGANIzATIONS, THEIR CONTRACTORS AND THEIR EMPLOyEES:  
THE EXAMPLE OF kOSOVO
Organizations Contractors of organizations
Profit tax VAT on  
imports
Personal income tax on 
employees:




Personal income tax on 
contractor’s employees:
foreign            local foreign local
          
UNMIK, OSCE, UN agencies N/A Excluded Exempt Exempt Exempt Taxable Rebatable Liable Exempt Taxable
KFOR N/A Excluded Exempt Taxable Taxable Taxable Rebatable Liable Exempt Taxable
World Bank / IMF N/A Excluded Exempt Exempt Taxable Taxable Rebatable Liable Exempt Taxable
Euro. Agency for Reconstruction N/A Excluded Exempt Taxable Taxable Taxable Rebatable Liable Exempt Taxable
USAID N/A Excluded Exempt Taxable Exempt Taxable Rebatable Liable Exempt Taxable
Country agreements N/A Excluded Exempt Taxable Exempt Exempt Rebatable Excluded Exempt Taxable
Liaison offices (including EC) N/A Excluded Exempt Taxable N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Taxable
NGOs Partly Rebatable Exempt Taxable Taxable Taxable Liable Liable Taxable Taxable
Provisional Government N/A Partly Taxable Taxable Taxable Taxable Liable Liable Taxable Taxable
Central Bank Exempt Liable Taxable Taxable Taxable Taxable Liable Liable Taxable Taxable
State-owned enterprises Exempt Partly Taxable Taxable Taxable Taxable Liable Liable Taxable Taxable
Private organizations Taxable Liable Taxable Taxable Taxable Taxable Liable Liable Taxable Taxable
source: Kosovo revenue authority. This is a simplified version of the actual table used by the Kra. The full table contains an additional five categories: presumptive tax on organizations, foreign firms, and local firms; 
VaT on internal supplies by organizations and VaT on supplies made by contractors of organizations to organizations.
APPENDIX 1